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We present a study investigating how the delay between the intention to act and the
following action, influenced the experience of action. In experiments investigating sense
of agency and experience of action, the contrast is most often between voluntary and
involuntary actions. It is rarely asked whether different types of intentions influence the
experience of action differently. To investigate this we distinguished between proximal
intentions (i.e., intentions for immediate actions) and delayed intentions (i.e., intentions
with a temporal delay between intention and action). The distinction was implemented
in an intentional binding paradigm, by varying the delay between the time where
participants formed the intention to act and the time at which they performed the action.
The results showed that delayed intentions were followed by a stronger binding effect
for the tone following the action compared to proximal intentions. The actions were
reported to have occurred earlier for delayed intentions than for proximal intentions.
This effect was independent of the binding effect usually found in intentional binding
experiments. This suggests that two perceptual shifts occurred in the contrast between
delayed intentions and proximal intentions: The first being the binding effect, the second
a general shift in the perceived time of action. Neither the stronger binding effect for
tone, nor the earlier reports of action, differed across delays for delayed intentions. The
results imply that delayed intentions and proximal intentions have a different impact on
the experience of action.
Keywords: intention, intentional binding, motor planning, proximal intention, distal intention, delayed intentions,
sense of agency, experience of action
Introduction
In the present study, we investigated how the intermediate delay between intention about a
forthcoming action, and the subsequent action, inﬂuenced the experience of action. To achieve
this we distinguished between proximal intentions and delayed intentions. Proximal intentions are
characterized by being immediately transformed into action when they are formed (Searle, 1980).
Delayed intentions are formed,maintained inmemory, and then realized into action at a later point
in time (Gilbert, 2011). The intentions are formed in the same manner for both types of intentions.
The diﬀerence is whether the intention is realized immediately or realized at a later time.
When making a voluntary action, we experience it as diﬀerent from passive or involuntary
actions (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). Voluntary actions are accompanied by the experience
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that we cause and control our own actions, a so-called sense of
agency (Bayne and Pacherie, 2007). How the intention to make
a voluntary action inﬂuence the experience of action is not well
understood. Experimental approaches that investigate experience
of action often distinguish between self-initiated actions and
actions that are cued or externally triggered, e.g., by transcranial
magnetic stimulation (Jensen et al., 2014). Such approach does
not tell us whether diﬀerent types of intentions aﬀect the
experience of action in diﬀerent ways. Experiments investigating
self-initiated actions usually consist of participants performing
spontaneous actions when they feel the ﬁrst intention, or
“urge,” to execute the action (following the instructions from
Libet et al., 1983). This type of task must be characterized
as investigating proximal intentions (Zhu, 2003; Mele, 2010).
Though understanding of how proximal intention relate to action
is an important aspect of voluntary action control, it is of equal
importance to understand how diﬀerent kinds of intentions relate
to action.
Pacherie (2008) has proposed a theoretical model of how
intentions are organized in a structure of hierarchical cognitive
processes. The cognitive processes behind action generation and
experience of action constitute the lowest level in the model.
While these processes are mostly automatic they are guided
by proximal intentions, which constitute a higher level in the
hierarchy. Longer lasting and abstract intentions are found at the
highest level in the hierarchy. Higher order intentions work as a
global set of parameters that guide action and inﬂuence the action
speciﬁc proximal intentions, as well as the processes of action
generation and processes generating the experience of action.
If the distinction between proximal and delayed intentions
follows such hierarchical organization they are to be considered
two diﬀerent types of intention involving diﬀerent cognitive
functions. However, proximal and delayed intention could be the
same cognitive process only extended in time. If this is the case,
then the distinction between delayed and proximal intentions are
merely conceptual, and they are better thought of as the same type
of intention.
A few studies have investigated the diﬀerence between
proximal intentions and delayed intentions (Vinding et al., 2013,
2014)1. Participants were instructed to either act immediately, or
wait a certain time-interval before acting, when they experienced
the intention to act. To investigate if delayed intentions aﬀected
the experience of action, we used an Intentional Binding
paradigm, with the addition of conditions where participants
formed the intention to act, but delayed the action. Intentional
Binding was ﬁrst described by Haggard et al. (2002), who showed
that when participants made voluntary actions that caused a tone,
the tone and the action were perceived, as closer together in time
compared to non-voluntary actions. This eﬀect is now known
as intentional binding, and is used as an implicit measure of
agency (Moore and Obhi, 2012; Jensen et al., 2015). Intentional
1In the cited papers, what we here refer to as “delayed intentions” was called “distal
intentions.” Elsewhere distal intention also refers to abstract intentions beyond
simple motor intentions (Pacherie, 2008; Mele, 2010; Synofzik et al., 2013). We
therefore adopt the designation “delayed intention” for intentions about speciﬁc
actions that are formed, then stored in memory, and later realized (following
Gilbert, 2011).
binding is deﬁned as a shift in perceived time of an action toward
the eﬀect of the action, and a complementary shift in perceived
time of eﬀect of action toward the time of action (Haggard
et al., 2002). The Intentional Binding paradigm is an example
of a method for investigating the experience of action using
proximal intentions. In our previous experiment we added a
delayed intention condition, to investigate the diﬀerence between
delayed and proximal intentions in the binding eﬀect. This
showed a stronger binding eﬀect for the tone following actions
for delayed intentions compared to proximal intentions (Vinding
et al., 2013).
The categorical distinction between proximal and delayed
intentions attempts to separate cases where an action is
performed immediately after the intention is formed, or whether
there is an intermediate delay. In previous experiments, a ﬁxed
intermediate delay was used between the time, intentions were
formed, and the time, the intentions were realized into actions
(Vinding et al., 2013, 2014). It was not addressed if the eﬀect of
delayed intentions changed as a consequence of the delay period
per se. We therefore included a series of delays between intention
and action. This speciﬁcally investigated whether the previously
shown eﬀect of delayed intentions should be taken as evidence
for two diﬀerent kinds of intention with diﬀerent functional
properties, or as evidence for a general eﬀect of delaying
responses. Thus, it was possible to test if the delay between
intention formation and action inﬂuenced the experience of
action.
If a diﬀerence in binding eﬀect between the two conditions is
a general eﬀect of delay between intention formation and action,
the binding eﬀect would be expected to increase gradually as
the delay between intention and action increased. The proximal
intention would show the least binding eﬀect and the longest
delay would exhibit the greatest binding eﬀect (Figure 1A).
However, if the diﬀerence is a result of two (at least partially)
distinct cognitive processes, a categorical diﬀerence in the
binding eﬀect between delayed or proximal intended actions
would be expected (Figure 1B). In this case, we would expect
diﬀerences between proximal intentions and delayed intentions,
but not between diﬀerent delays for delayed intentions.
Experiment 1
Materials and Methods
Fifteen participants between 19 and 26 years (mean: 23.1 years,
10 female) participated in the experiment. All participants gave
written consent after being informed about the procedure of
the experiment. The experiment took about 2 h. Participants
received 200 DKK for participating in the experiment. The
Central Denmark Region Committees on Health Research Ethics
provided written conﬁrmation that no ethical approval was
required according to Danish law.
The experimental set-up was based on a typical intention
binding paradigm (Haggard et al., 2002). The action was the same
for proximal and delayed intentions. In the proximal conditions,
the action was executed immediately, whereas in the delayed
conditions, the action was delayed (see Figure 2). Participants
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration of the two hypotheses about the
difference in binding effect across delays between intention and
action. The binding effect is defined as a shift from baseline in the perceived
time of action and tone. Press is marked by circles and tone is marked by
triangles. Open symbols indicates baseline and solid symbols indicate
operant conditions. (A) If a difference in binding effect between delayed and
proximal intentions was a result of the intermediate time between intention
and action, the binding effect would be expected to increase gradually
following the delay between intention and action. (B) If delayed and proximal
intentions are different processes with different impact on the experience of
action not dependent on time, we would expect a categorical difference
between proximal and delayed intentions.
formed both the proximal and delayed intentions at their own
pace. This matched the usual instructions given in intentional
binding experiments (Haggard et al., 2002; Moore and Obhi,
2012). Retrieval of delayed intentions was cue-based.
In all trials participants watched a clock with a dot rotating
on the edge at 2560 ms per rotation. The periphery of the clock
had a visual angle of 2◦. The action consisted of participants
pressing a key on a standard computer keyboard with the right
hand. When the key was pressed a single tone (1000 Hz for
100 ms) were presented 250 ms later in headphones worn by
the participants. Stings of letters were presented in the center
of the clock, one letter at the time. The string of letters was
generated for each trial in a pseudorandom manner so all letters
were repeated one, three or ﬁve letters later. Each letter was
shown for 800 ms followed by 200 ms blank before the next letter
was shown. Clock and letters were shown in white on a black
background. The presentation of letters was pseudo-randomized,
so each letter was repeated after one, three, or ﬁve letters. The
paradigm was programmed and ran in PsychoPy (v. 1.79.01,
Peirce, 2008).
The task consisted of two instructions about how to plan
and execute the action (Figure 2). In the proximal conditions
participants had to press the key immediately when they had
the intention to act. Participants were speciﬁcally asked not to
plan in advance when to press the key. In the delayed conditions,
participants had to form the intention to press the key, similar
to the proximal condition, but instead of executing the action
immediately, they should notice the shown letter and delay the
key press until the same letter reappeared. The delay between
the intention and action execution would always be either one,
three, or ﬁve letters long, corresponding to a delay of 1, 3, or 5 s.
After each trial participants reported either the time on the clock
where they made the action or where they heard the tone (see
Table 1).
In the delayed conditions, participants had to store one letter
in memory when they formed the intention to act and keep
it until they had performed the action. To minimize possible
confounds, the letters were shown in all conditions. Participants
were instructed to focus on the letters, even when not needed to
perform the task. It was possible that the task of remembering
the letter for delayed intentions interfered with the subjective
reports by reducing precision of the reported times. In intentional
binding the diﬃculty of the task can be assessed by comparing the
variance in the reported times between the diﬀerent tasks (Jensen
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FIGURE 2 | Schematic illustration of the experimental conditions. Each
trial started when the clock began to run. Letters were shown in the
middle of the clock one at the time for 800 ms, followed by 200 ms
blank. (A) In proximal conditions participants pressed the key as soon as
they had the intention to act. (B) In the delayed conditions participant had
to notice the letter, when they had the intention to act, and then press
when the same latter was presented again. In all operant conditions a
tone were played 250 ms after the press. After a short random delay,
participants had to report the “time” on the clock, when they either made
the action or heard the tone.
et al., 2015). We therefore conducted Pitman–Morgan tests, to
test for unequal variance across delays, before proceeding to the
main analysis.
The proximal and delayed conditions consisted of operant
and baseline conditions. In operant conditions, the tone always
followed when a press was made. The baseline conditions for
press reports were identical to the operant conditions except
the press was not followed by the tone. The instructions were
identical to the operant conditions. For tone reports there
was a single baseline condition for both delayed and proximal
conditions. The tone was played at a random time between 2.5
and 7 s after trial start, without participants pressing the key.
Participants were instructed to wait for the tone and afterward
report the time it occurred.
The diﬀerent conditions were presented in blocks consisting of
40 trials each. Each delayed conditions were repeated three times
(see Table 1), to ensure an approximately even amount of trials
between the proximal conditions and the diﬀerent delays in the
TABLE 1 | Experimental conditions.
Conditions Events Delay Report Block
repetitions
Press conditions
Delayed – Baseline Press 1, 3, or 5 Press 3
Delayed – Operant Press + Tone 1, 3, or 5 Press 3
Proximal – Baseline Press 0 Press 1
Proximal – Operant Press + Tone 0 Press 1
Tone conditions
Delayed – Operant Press + Tone 1, 3, or 5 Tone 3
Proximal – Operant Press + Tone 0 Tone 1
Baseline Tone – Tone 1
delayed conditions. This gave a total of 13 blocks (520 trials). The
order of blocks was randomized for each participant.
Before the experiment began, participants completed 10
training trials for both delayed and proximal conditions, half of
which were tone reports and half of which were press reports.
Participants were encouraged to take breaks between each block.
Participants were instructed to mark trials in which they failed to
comply with the instructions in any way, e.g., by missing target
letters, by pressing an “error-key.”
For each trial the “judgment error” was calculated as diﬀerence
between the reported time and the actual recorded time of the
event by the computer. Due to an error, the time the tones
were played was logged incorrect. Hence, only responses from
the press conditions were analyzed. The tone conditions were
repeated in a second experiment (Experiment 2). The repetition
of the tone conditions in a new experiment was not a concern,
as it has been shown that the binding eﬀect depends on partially
diﬀerent processes for tone and press (Moore and Fletcher, 2012;
Wolpe et al., 2013).
Trials in which participants reported they made an error, and
trials where the letter shown at press was not similar to the
letter shown one, three, or ﬁve letters earlier, were removed.
Trials where the judgment error were greater than 400 ms
from the participant’s median judgment error were classiﬁed as
outliers and removed. One whole block from a single participant
was excluded as the participant had removed the headphones.
An average of 5.4% (range: 9–13.4%) of trials were discarded
per participant due to errors. 1.2% (range: 0–4.7%) trials were
discarded due to extreme values.
Data was analyzed by mixed-eﬀect regression models using
R (R Core Team) and the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2014).
The regression models were ﬁtted to the judgment error for
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all individual trials by full maximum-likelihood estimation. The
full model contained the factor delay [zero delay (proximal
condition), one-letter delay, three-letter delay, and ﬁve-letter
delay], the factor condition (baseline or operant), and the
interaction between the factors. Signiﬁcance testing was done by
removing predictors one by one from the full model, starting
with the highest order interaction. Models with and without each
predictor were then compared by log-likelihood ratio tests. In
addition to the predictors of interest the full model included trial
order and block order to control the eﬀect of the experiment
duration. Both these predictors were centered on their means so
coeﬃcients of the model reﬂected the average inﬂuence of these
eﬀects. To test whether the duration of the experiment or the
unequal number of blocks of proximal and delayed conditions
the full model included the interaction between block order, delay
and condition. The random eﬀects structure contained the factors
delay and condition and individual slopes for the eﬀect of block
order for each participant.
Results
The tests for unequal variance across delays did not suggest
that any of the delayed conditions were more diﬃcult than the
proximal condition (all p-values in range p = [38.91] for the
operant conditions, and all p-values in range [10.92] for baseline
conditions). None of the participants reported to have noticed the
letters were systematically presented one, three, or ﬁve letters later
when directly asked after the experiment.
Model comparison showed signiﬁcant eﬀect of condition
[χ2(1) = 4.6, p = 0.031]. The coeﬃcient for condition has a
positive sign, which conﬁrms that a binding eﬀect is occurring
(see Figure 3, bottom). There was a signiﬁcant eﬀect of delay
[χ2(3) = 20.3, p = 0.0001] and the interaction between delay
and condition was signiﬁcant [χ2(3) = 10.2, p = 0.017]. In
addition to the main eﬀects of interest there was a signiﬁcant
eﬀect of trial number [χ2(1) = 6.9, p = 0.008], and a signiﬁcant
eﬀect of the interaction between trial number and block order
[χ2(1) = 4.1, p = 0.044], but no signiﬁcant eﬀect of block
number alone [χ2(1) = 0.17, p = 0.68]. There were no
signiﬁcant eﬀects of the interactions between block order and
delay [χ2(3) = 4.5, p = 0.21] or block order and condition
[χ2(1) = 1.9, p = 0.17]. There was a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the
three-way interaction between block order, condition and delay
[χ2(3) = 24.6, p < 0.0001]. As block order and trial order were
centered on their means, all other parameters reﬂect the “average”
eﬀect of experiment duration. The group level reported times
of press estimated from the model are presented in Table 2.
FIGURE 3 | (Top) Reported times of action relative to the actual occurrence
of action, across delays for the baseline and the operant conditions. The dots
show the estimates for each participant, and the solid bars show the group
level times. (Bottom) Group level estimated binding effect for press.
Error-bars indicate 95% confidence intervals of the estimated effects based
on posterior simulation of the full model (n = 10000).
Coeﬃcients of the full model are presented in the Supplementary
Table S1.
Goodness of ﬁt was assessed by conditional goodness of ﬁt,
describing the overall ﬁt of the model, and the marginal goodness
of ﬁt giving the variance explained by the ﬁxed eﬀect alone
TABLE 2 | Reported occurrence of the press for operant conditions and baseline conditions, and the binding effect indicating the shift from baseline to
operant condition, for all subjects.
Operant (action + tone) Baseline (action only) Binding effect
Zero delay (proximal) 58.5 ms [13.3:103.9] 35.5 ms [−10.6:82.1] 23.0 ms [1.5:44.6]
One-letter delay 3.6 ms [−41.6:49.7] 0.5 ms [−44.4:47.2] 3.1 ms [−17.2:23.0]
Three-letter delay 10.1 ms [−35.6:56.1] −6.8 ms [−52.3:39.3] 16.8 ms [−3.0:36.6]
Five-letter delay 19.9 ms [−25.4:66.3] −9.1 ms [−55.2:37.8] 29.0 ms [7.5:50.2]
Numbers in brackets are 95% confidence intervals estimated by posterior simulation of the full model (n = 10000).
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(Nakagawa and Schielzeth, 2013). The full model explained 44%
of the total variation in the data (conditional R2 = 0.44). There
was large variance between intercepts for individual subjects
(SD = 79.6 ms), but less variation on individual intercepts within
factors. The ﬁxed eﬀects alone explained 4% of the total variation
(marginal R2 = 0.04).
The signiﬁcant interaction between delay and condition meant
that the binding eﬀect was diﬀerent between the diﬀerent delays
(Figure 3, top). Wald χ2 tests (De Rosario-Martinez, 2013) were
performed to test what drove the interaction between delay and
condition. This showed signiﬁcant diﬀerences in binding eﬀect
between proximal and one-letter delay [χ2(1) = 4.3, p = 0.038]
and between ﬁve-letter delay and one-letter delay [χ2(1) = 7.5,
p= 0.006]. No other signiﬁcant diﬀerences were found in binding
eﬀect between delays (all p> 0.19). The binding eﬀect was weaker
for one-letter delay compared to the proximal condition and ﬁve-
letter delay.
To test what drove the signiﬁcant eﬀect of delay, tests were
conducted between all delays for both baseline and operant
conditions. This showed signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the zero
delay condition and all other delays in both baseline conditions
[0–1: χ2(1) = 7.3, p = 0.007, 0–3: χ2(1) = 10.7, p = 0.001,
0–5: χ2(1) = 11.2, p = 0.0008], and operant conditions [0–1:
χ2(1) = 18.3, p < 0.0001, 0–3: χ2(1) = 14.6, p = 0.0001, 0–5:
χ2(1) = 8.9, p = 0.003]. No other signiﬁcant diﬀerences were
found between delays for neither operant nor baseline conditions
(all p > 0.21). The time of action in the proximal condition were
reported later than all delayed conditions. This did not diﬀer
between delays (Figure 3, top).
Discussion of Experiment 1
The results showed diﬀerences in binding eﬀect between delays,
but only between the one-letter delay and the longest delay,
and the one-letter delay and proximal conditions. The most
striking ﬁnding was that the reported times of press were earlier
in all delayed conditions than in the proximal conditions. The
baseline time for the intentional binding was earlier in the delayed
conditions compared to the proximal condition. This means that
two kinds of “temporal shifts” occurred in the experience of
action. The ﬁrst shift was the binding eﬀect, where the reported
occurrence of action was shifted from the baseline toward the
tone, as reported many times before (for review, see Moore and
Obhi, 2012). The second shift was a shift in the baseline timing of
action between proximal and delayed conditions.
It was hypothesized that there would be a gradual increase
in binding eﬀect as the delay between intention and action
increased, if longer time was the underlying reason for the
diﬀerence. If delayed and proximal intentions were diﬀerent types
of intention inﬂuencing the experience of action diﬀerent ways,
then a categorical diﬀerence were expected. The diﬀerences in
baseline between proximal and all delays but not between any
other delays, supports the “categorical” hypothesis. This result
were, however, unexpected, as our hypotheses were about the
binding eﬀect, deﬁned as the shift from baseline, not about the
baselines alone.
The diﬀerences in the binding eﬀect did not match either of
the two hypothesized scenarios. There was no gradual increase
in binding eﬀect starting with proximal condition and increasing
as the delay increased. Neither were there a clear categorical
diﬀerence between the proximal condition and the delayed
conditions in the binding eﬀect. A gradual increase might be
hinted starting at the one-letter delay and increasing as the delay
increased, but the results are not conclusive. However, if this
were the case, then it would mean that our hypothesis that delay
between intention and action, only applies for delayed intentions.
It does not apply for proximal intentions that are immediately
realized into action.
Experiment 2
Materials and Methods
Twelve new participants (aged 20–26 years, mean: 23.1 years,
6 female) were recruited. All gave written consent after being
informed about the procedure of the experiment. The experiment
lasted for about 1 h. Participants received 100 DKK for
participating.
The participants went through the tone conditions of
the paradigm described above, consisting of three diﬀerent
instructions (see Table 3). In the proximal condition, participants
had to press the key immediately when they had the intention
to act. In the delayed conditions, participants had to form the
intention to press the key and delay the key-press until the same
letter reappeared. A tone (1000 Hz for 100 ms) was played 250ms
after the key-press in both proximal and delayed conditions. In
the baseline conditions, the tone was played at a random time
within 2.5 to 7 s after trial start, without participants pressing the
key. In all conditions, participants had to report the time they
heard the tone.
The length of the blocks was reduced from 40 trials per block
to two blocks with 20 trials per block. This gave two blocks
of proximal conditions, six blocks of delayed conditions, and
two blocks of baseline conditions. The order of the blocks was
randomized for each participant.
Participants completed ﬁve training trials for each condition
to become familiar with the instructions. Participants were
instructed to mark any trials where they failed to comply with
the instructions by pressing an “error-key.” Participants were
encouraged to take breaks between the blocks.
The judgment error, i.e., diﬀerence between the reported time
and the recorded time of the tone was calculated for each trial.
Trials were rejected following the same criteria as in Experiment
1. An average of 2.6% (range: 0–5.0%) of trials were discarded
TABLE 3 | Experimental conditions.
Tone conditions
Conditions Events Delay Report Block
repetitions
Delayed – Operant Press + Tone 1, 3, or 5 Tone 6
Proximal – Operant Press + Tone 0 Tone 2
Baseline Tone – Tone 2
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FIGURE 4 | (Top) Reported times of the tone relative to the actual occurrence
of tone, for baseline condition, proximal condition, and the different delays.
The dots indicate the individual time of report for each participant and the
solid bars indicate the group level estimates. (Bottom) Group level estimated
binding effect for tone in Experiment 2. Error-bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals of the estimated effects based on posterior simulation (n = 10000).
and 2.4% (range: 0–11.5%) trials were discarded due to extreme
values.
Data was analyzed by mixed-eﬀect regression. Models were
ﬁtted by full maximum likelihood estimation to the judgment
errors using all trials. The main factor condition had ﬁve-levels
containing zero-delay (proximal condition), one-letter delay,
three-letter delay, ﬁve-letter delay, and the baseline condition.
Trial order, block order, and the interaction between delays and
block order, were included in the model to test for the eﬀect
of the duration of the experiment. Both trial order and block
order were centered on their means. Individual intercepts were
ﬁtted for each participant for condition and individual slopes for
block order. Signiﬁcance testing was done by model comparisons
following the same procedure as Experiment 1. The diﬀerences
between proximal and the one-, three- and ﬁve-letter delays were
investigated by planned post hoc comparison.
Results
The Pitman–Morgan tests for unequal variance between
conditions showed a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between baseline and
the longest delay (t = −2.5, p = 0.03). There were no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between any other combinations of conditions (all
p-values in range p = [11.79]). Though the longest delay was
more diﬃcult than the baseline, there was nothing that suggested
that reporting the delayed conditions were more diﬃcult than the
proximal condition.
Model comparison showed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of condition
[χ2(4) = 51.7, p < 0.0001]. The coeﬃcients showed earlier
judgment of the occurrence of tone for all operant conditions
compared to the baseline condition, which conﬁrms the binding
eﬀect in the tone conditions (see Figure 4). There was no
signiﬁcant eﬀect of trial number [χ2(1) = 0.07, p = 0.79],
probably due to the shorter block length than Experiment
1. There was signiﬁcant eﬀect of block order [χ2(1) = 4.3,
p = 0.038] but no signiﬁcant interaction between trial number
and block order [χ2(1) = 0.06, p = 0.81]. There were
no signiﬁcant interaction between condition and block order
[χ2(4)= 6.8, p = 0.15]. The eﬀect of experiment duration did not
diﬀer between conditions. The group level reported times of tone
estimated from the model are presented in Table 4. Coeﬃcients
of the full model are presented in the Supplementary Table S2.
The model explained 57% (conditional R2 = 0.57) of the
variance in the data. There was a large variance between
individual subjects (SD = 95.4 ms) and relatively large variance
in the individual intercepts within condition (SD = 47.5 ms).
The ﬁxed eﬀects alone accounted for 15% of the variance in data
(marginal R2 = 0.15).
Comparison between levels in the factor condition showed
that all operant conditions were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
baseline condition (all p < 0.0001). The diﬀerence between zero
delay and the delay of one letter was not signiﬁcant [χ2(1) = 2.5,
p = 0.11]. There were signiﬁcant diﬀerences between zero delay
and three-letter delay [χ2(1) = 5.0, p = 0.026] and between zero
delay and ﬁve-letter delay [χ2(1) = 3.9, p = 0.048]. There were
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences across delays in the delay conditions
(all p> 0.56). The binding eﬀect was stronger for the three-letter
and ﬁve-letter delays than in the proximal condition. The binding
eﬀect did not diﬀer between the diﬀerent delays in the delayed
condition.
Discussion of Experiment 2
The binding eﬀect for tone did not follow the same pattern
across delays as we found for press reports in Experiment
1. In Experiment 2, we found substantial binding eﬀect in
all operant conditions. The binding eﬀects were strongest for
delayed intentions. This ﬁnding is consistent with the previous
study showing stronger tone binding for delayed conditions
(Vinding et al., 2013).
In the present study it was further tested whether the
binding eﬀect for delayed intentions varied across diﬀerent delays
between intentions and actions. No diﬀerences were found in the
reports of tones between the diﬀerent delays within the delayed
conditions, only between proximal and delayed intentions. The
results did not support the hypothesis that gradually increases
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TABLE 4 | Reported occurrence of the tone for operant conditions and baseline condition, and the binding effect indicating the shift from baseline to
operant condition, for all subjects.
Operant (action + tone) Baseline (tone only) Binding effect
Zero delay (proximal) 90.0 ms [−150.2: −28.4] 33.5 ms [−27.7:94.0] 123.5 ms [−164.2: −82.7]
One-letter delay −123.6 ms [−185.0: −62.3] 33.5 ms [−27.7:94.0] 157.1 ms [−199.2:115.7]
Three-letter delay −135.8 ms [−195.7: −74.7] 33.5 ms [−27.7:94.0] 169.3 ms [−209.6: −128.5]
Five-letter delay −131.0 ms [−191.0: −71.6] 33.5 ms [−27.7:94.0] 164.5 ms [−205.0: −123.8]
Numbers in brackets are 95% confidence intervals estimated by posterior simulation of the full model (n = 10000). The baseline condition was the same for all delays.
in delay would lead to a gradual increase in binding eﬀect. The
results ﬁt better to the “categorical” hypothesis.
General Discussion
The experiments showed that the temporal delay between
intention and action lead to changes in the reported occurrence
of actions and their eﬀects. For neither the reports of action
nor the reports of tone did we ﬁnd support for the hypothesis
that there would be a gradual increase in the binding eﬀect.
The results do support the hypothesis that there would be a
categorical diﬀerence between delayed and proximally intended
actions. This diﬀerence was most notable for the tone reports,
where delayed intentions were followed by a stronger binding
eﬀect compared to proximal intentions. The binding eﬀect did
not diﬀer between delays for delayed intentions. The binding
eﬀect for action did not clearly support any of our initial
hypotheses. However, the diﬀerence in the baseline between
proximal intentions and all the delayed intentions, which did not
diﬀer between delays for delayed intentions, imply a categorical
diﬀerence (see Figure 5).
The binding eﬀect did not follow the same pattern for tone
and press. This is neither a new nor an uncommon ﬁnding.
Wolpe et al. (2013) introduced an uncertainty in the tones
that followed actions in an intentional binding paradigm by
partially masking the tone with auditory noise. This aﬀected
the binding eﬀect for tone but not the binding eﬀect for press.
Similar disassociations in intentional binding between press and
tone have been induced by TMS to pre-supplementary motor
FIGURE 5 | Group level reported times of press and tone. Press is
marked by circle and tone is marked by triangles. Open symbols indicate
baseline conditions and solid symbols indicate operant conditions. Arrows
indicate the shift from the baselines to the operant conditions that define the
binding effect. The vertical dashed lines are the actual occurrence of press
and tone 250 ms apart.
area only aﬀecting press binding (Moore et al., 2010), and by
transcranial direct current stimulation to left parietal cortex
which only aﬀected tone binding (Khalighinejad and Haggard,
2015). The cognitive mechanism behind intentional binding and
the experience of action have been proposed to be a result of
integration of multiple feedback cues from diﬀerent modalities
that are weighted according to the certainties of the diﬀerent
feedback signals (Moore and Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik et al.,
2013). In accordance with this view the present results suggest
that delayed and proximal intentions aﬀected the binding eﬀect
diﬀerently for the two diﬀerent modalities.
The results show evidence for two perceptual shifts: The
ﬁrst shift was the binding eﬀect between action and eﬀect
(i.e., intentional binding) and second shift was in the baselines
between proximal and delayed conditions. The occurrence of
both action and tone were reported earlier in the delayed
conditions compared to the proximal conditions. This could
mean that the baseline shift in the times of action for delayed
intentions drove the earlier occurrence of the tone for delayed
intentions in the tone conditions. The earlier reported occurrence
of the tone is a joint eﬀect of the earlier reported time of
action. Both are shifted to an earlier time together as a pair.
Several authors have proposed that delayed intentions involve
prospective predictions or representations established before
action is initiated, occurring outside the processes in immediate
relation to action execution, that functions as global parameters
for action selection (Pacherie, 2008; Hommel, 2009; Synofzik
et al., 2013). Though longer lasting intentions often also is
referring to abstract intentions beyond simple motor intentions,
our results could be interpreted as a similar eﬀect of delayed
intentions for speciﬁc actions. Delayed motor intentions shifted
the experience of action and tone to an earlier time.
However, due to the diﬀerent baselines from which the
binding eﬀect is deﬁned for tone and press reports it is impossible
to determine, whether the earlier reported time of tone for
delayed intentions should be seen as a single binding eﬀect, or
the sum of intentional binding and an additional shift following
earlier perception of action. Tone reports had a single common
baseline, in which participants had to await the tone without
a preceding intentional action. In the press conditions, each
delay had a corresponding baseline condition. For press reports,
participants made an action in the baseline conditions, whereas
the baseline condition for tone was passive.
Certain limitations are present in this study related to making
inference on the diﬀerence between delayed and proximal
intentions. How much delay there can be between a delayed
intention and action is not limited to the time-scale used in
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the experiment. The maximum delay in our study was 5 s. The
temporal delay was limited to make the experiment feasible.
Subjects could have delayed intentions about doing an action
after 10 s, after minutes, or days, after a year, and so on. Though
the results imply a categorical diﬀerence between delayed and
proximal intentions rather than a dependency upon the delay
itself, how this generalizes to longer delays is uncertain.
The delayed intention task engages prospective memory in
a way that the proximal intention task does not. Memory load
could therefore be a possible confounding factor explaining the
diﬀerence between delayed and proximal intentions. Memory
load has been shown to lower judgments of agency when actions
are performed while under high attentional load (Hon et al.,
2013). As intentional binding is taken as an implicit measure of
agency, it must be hypothesized that working memory load would
decrease the binding eﬀect. This is not what we observe. We
interpreted this, as memory load was not a confounding factor
when measuring the experience of action for delayed intentions.
Intentional binding has previously been investigated in
combination with additional visual stimuli without introducing
any apparent artifacts in the results (Engbert and Wohlschläger,
2007; Desantis et al., 2011; Moretto et al., 2011).
Here we showed that for self-paced intentions, the experience
of actions is dependent on the delay between intention and
action. We used a cued realization of delayed intentions. Other
ways of retrieval and realization of delayed intentions, e.g.,
time based or self-initiated retrieval (McDaniel and Einstein,
2000; West and Krompinger, 2005; Gilbert et al., 2009), might
be followed by diﬀerent experience of action. Whether the
diﬀerence between self-paced proximal and delayed intentions
also generalizes to other types of intention, such as abstract
intentions, is a topic for future studies.
Given these limitations, the diﬀerence in perceived time of
action and eﬀect is evidence in favor of delayed and proximal
intentions having diﬀerent functional impact the experience of
action. Though the relation between diﬀerent types of intention
and action has not been thoroughly investigated, we have argued
for a diﬀerence in the experience of action by way of the simple
distinction between proximal and delayed intentions. This also
highlights that in order to fully understand intentions and the
experience of action, future studies need to take into account that
intention does not seem to be a uniﬁed concept.
Acknowledgments
The idea and design for the study was conceived by MV, MJ,
and MO. MV conducted the experiments and analyzed data.
All authors contributed to the manuscript. MV and MJ were
supported by The Danish Council for Independent Research |
Humanities. MO is supported by a starting grant from ERC.
Supplementary Material
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fnhum.
2015.00366
References
Bates, D., Mächler, M., Bolker, B. M., and Walker, S. C. (2014). Fitting linear
mixed-eﬀects models using lme4. arXiv:1406.5823 [stat].
Bayne, T., and Pacherie, E. (2007). Narrators and comparators: the architecture
of agentive self-awareness. Synthese 159, 475–491. doi: 10.1007/s11229-007-
9239-9
De Rosario-Martinez, H. (2013). phia: Post-Hoc Interaction Analysis. R Package
Version 0.1-5. Available at: http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=phia
Desantis, A., Roussel, C., and Waszak, F. (2011). On the inﬂuence of causal
beliefs on the feeling of agency. Conscious. Cogn. 20, 1211–1220. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2011.02.012
Engbert, K., and Wohlschläger, A. (2007). Intentions and expectations in temporal
binding. Conscious. Cogn. 16, 255–264. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2006.09.010
Gilbert, S. J. (2011). Decoding the content of delayed intentions. J. Neurosci. 31,
2888–2894. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5336-10.2011
Gilbert, S. J., Gollwitzer, P. M., Cohen, A.-L., Oettingen, G., and Burgess, P. W.
(2009). Separable brain systems supporting cued versus self-initiated realization
of delayed intentions. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 35, 905–915. doi:
10.1037/a0015535
Haggard, P., Clark, S., and Kalogeras, J. (2002). Voluntary action and conscious
awareness. Nat. Neurosci. 5, 382–385. doi: 10.1038/nn827
Hommel, B. (2009). Action control according to TEC (theory of event coding).
Psychol. Res. 73, 512–526. doi: 10.1007/s00426-009-0234-2
Hon, N., Poh, J.-H., and Soon, C. S. (2013). Preoccupied minds feel less control:
sense of agency is modulated by cognitive load. Conscious. Cogn. 22, 556–561.
doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.004
Jensen,M., Di Costa, S., and Haggard, P. (2015). Intentional Binding – AMeasure of
Agency. I M. Overgaard (Red.), Behavioural Methods in Consciousness Research.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jensen, M., Vagnoni, E., Overgaard, M., and Haggard, P. (2014). Experience
of action depends on intention, not body movement: an experiment
on memory for mens rea. Neuropsychologia 55, 122–127. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.07.022
Khalighinejad, N., and Haggard, P. (2015). Modulating human sense of
agency with non-invasive brain stimulation. Cortex 69, 93–103. doi:
10.1016/j.cortex.2015.04.015
Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., and Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious
intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential).
Brain 106, 623–642. doi: 10.1093/brain/106.3.623
McDaniel, M. A., and Einstein, G. O. (2000). Strategic and automatic processes in
prospective memory retrieval: a multiprocess framework. Appl. Cognit. Psychol.
14, S127–S144. doi: 10.1002/acp.775
Mele, A. R. (2010). Testing free will. Neuroethics 3, 161–172. doi: 10.1007/s12152-
008-9027-3
Moore, J. W., and Fletcher, P. C. (2012). Sense of agency in health and disease:
a review of cue integration approaches. Conscious. Cogn. 21, 59–68. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2011.08.010
Moore, J. W., and Obhi, S. S. (2012). Intentional binding and the sense of agency: a
review.Conscious. Cogn. 21, 546–561. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.12.002
Moore, J.W., Ruge, D.,Wenke, D., Rothwell, J., and Haggard, P. (2010). Disrupting
the experience of control in the human brain: pre-supplementary motor
area contributes to the sense of agency. Proc. Biol. Sci. 277, 2503–2509. doi:
10.1098/rspb.2010.0404
Moretto, G., Walsh, E., and Haggard, P. (2011). Experience of agency
and sense of responsibility. Conscious. Cogn. 20, 1847–1854. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2011.08.014
Nakagawa, S., and Schielzeth, H. (2013). A general and simple method for
obtaining R2 from generalized linear mixed-eﬀects models.Methods Ecol. Evol.
4, 133–142. doi: 10.1111/j.2041-210x.2012.00261.x
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 9 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 366
Vinding et al. Time affects experience of action
Pacherie, E. (2008). The phenomenology of action: a conceptual
framework. Cognition 107, 179–217. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2007.
09.003
Peirce, J. W. (2008). Generating stimuli for neuroscience using PsychoPy. Front.
Neuroinform. 2:10. doi: 10.3389/neuro.11.010.2008
Searle, J. R. (1980). The intentionality of intention and action. Cogn. Sci. 4, 47–70.
doi: 10.1016/S0364-0213(81)80004-3
Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., and Voss, M. (2013). The experience of agency:
an interplay between prediction and postdiction. Front. Psychol. 4:127. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00127
Tsakiris, M., and Haggard, P. (2005). Experimenting with the acting self. Cogn.
Neuropsychol. 22, 387–407. doi: 10.1080/02643290442000158
Vinding, M. C., Jensen,M., and Overgaard, M. (2014). Distinct electrophysiological
potentials for intention in action and prior intention for action. Cortex 50,
86–99. doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2013.09.001
Vinding, M. C., Pedersen, M. N., and Overgaard, M. (2013). Unravelling
intention: distal intentions increase the subjective sense of
agency. Conscious. Cogn. 22, 810–815. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2013.
05.003
West, R., and Krompinger, J. (2005). Neural correlates of prospective
and retrospective memory. Neuropsychologia 43, 418–433. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2004.06.012
Wolpe, N., Haggard, P., Siebner, H. R., and Rowe, J. B. (2013). Cue integration and
the perception of action in intentional binding. Exp. Brain Res. 229, 467–474.
doi: 10.1007/s00221-013-3419-2
Zhu, J. (2003). Reclaiming volition: an alternative interpretation of Libet’s
experiment. J. Conscious. Stud. 10, 61–77.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or ﬁnancial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conﬂict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Vinding, Jensen and Overgaard. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 10 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 366
